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U.S. inflation was surprisingly low in 1988, considering 
the strength of the demand for goods and services. 
Nevertheless, the costs of producing goods to meet that 
demand accelerated as factory operations moved close 
to capacity and a record proportion of the population 
became employed. The challenge for the economy in 
the next two years is to moderate demand enough so 
that these cost pressures don't burst into rapid price 
increases, but not so much that output falls—in short, to 
walk the fine line between high inflation and recession. 
Although there is a reasonable chance that the economy 
will be able to do this, it will need good luck and good 
policies. 
Surprisingly Low Inflation 
Inflation was lower last year than conventional eco-
nomic analysis would have predicted. 
Conventional analysis suggests that inflation rises as 
an economic expansion lengthens and rates of resource 
utilization rise. That follows from a view of how total 
demand and supply interact. According to this view, 
output and prices are determined by the intersection of 
a significantly shifting demand schedule and a slowly 
shifting supply schedule. (See Chart 1.) Changes in 
output that occur during a business cycle primarily 
reflect changes in demand—for example, increases in 
purchases of durables by consumers and equipment by 
businesses. Supply expands slowly over time as the 
work force grows and technology improves. 
Chart 1 
A Conventional View of Inflation 
During an Economic Expansion 
According to conventional analysis, at any point in 
time, the supply schedule is relatively flat at low levels 
of resource utilization, but relatively steep at high 
levels. This is because, at low levels, firms can acquire 
additional resources, or inputs, without bidding up re-
source prices, but at high levels, those prices must be 
bid up to attract the resources away from alternate uses. 
The resource price increases that firms face at each 
3 Chart 2 
40 Years of Inflation 
Measured by the U.S. Gross National Product Deflator, 






*The 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quarters of 1988 are adjusted tor the drought. The 4th quarter of 1988 is preliminary. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 
point and those that they expect to face in the near 
future are passed on to consumers. Thus, early in an 
expansion, when resource utilization levels are low, 
increases in demand cause corresponding increases in 
output with only mild increases in prices. But as an 
expansion lengthens and resource utilization levels 
become high, increases in demand cause small in-
creases in output and large increases in prices. 
From this perspective, the conditions for higher in-
flation were present in 1988. It was very late in an 
expansion: By December, real gross national product 
(GNP, adjusted for inflation) had expanded for over 70 
months, making this the longest peacetime expansion 
in the century. Total demand was clearly strong: Over 
the four quarters of 1988, real final sales (a measure of 
demand) grew 4 percent.
1 And by December, utiliza-
tion of both capital and labor was high: The manufac-
turing capacity utilization rate was 84.4 percent, the 
highest it has been since 1979; the civilian unemploy-
ment rate was 5.3 percent, the lowest it has been since 
1974; and the proportion of the working-age popula-
tion employed was 61.6 percent, the highest it has ever 
been. 
Shaded areas indicate business cycle recessions. 
Despite these conditions, inflation did not rise signifi-
cantly in 1988, according to some key measures. The 
broadest measure of inflation—the growth in the GNP 
deflator—accelerated very little. Adjusted for the ef-
fects of last year's severe drought, the deflator rose 
3.5 percent in 1988,
2 only slightly more than its 3.1 
percent rise in 1987. Chart 2 shows that the annual 
growth in the deflator has not changed much since 
1983. This pattern is matched by that of a narrower 
inflation measure, the consumer price index with its 
volatile food and energy components removed. By both 
measures, inflation in 1988 held fairly steady in the 
neighborhood of 4 percent. 
lrThis measure excludes Commodity Credit Corporation payments be-
cause the national income accounts treat them as government purchases, but 
they really are additions to government inventories. 
2 We subtract the effect of last year's drought on inflation because we 
expect this effect to be temporary. One way to adjust the GNP deflator for the 
drought is to use the U.S. Commerce Department's estimate that real output 
growth fell 0.6 of a percentage point last year due to the drought. We consider 
this adjustment to be a supply shock and use the empirical approximation that 
aggregate demand in the United States is unit elastic (Nelson 1988). This 
approximation implies that the drought raised the GNP deflator just as much as 
it lowered real GNP. A GNP deflator measure of inflation adjusted for the 
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This outcome is especially surprising because in the 
past inflation has tended to rise when these conditions 
were met, just as the conventional analysis predicts. As 
Chart 2 also shows, since the end of World War II (until 
recently), inflation has risen as expansions have length-
ened. (For more discussion of this relationship, see U.S. 
President 1989, p. 268.) Also, inflation has tended to be 
higher at high rates of resource utilization. This is clear, 
for example, when the data for 1988 are compared to 
those for 1979, a year when rates of resource utilization 
were about as high as they were in 1988. Table 1 shows 
that, by four very different measures, inflation in 1988 
was relatively low. 
Inflation last year also surprised a statistical model 
maintained by researchers at the Minneapolis Fed. This 
Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR) model as-
sumes no particular structure for demand and supply, as 
conventional analysis does. Rather, the model attempts 
to capture important statistical patterns in the ways 
different economic variables evolve over time. Since 
the model includes 47 monthly variables with lagged 
values of up to 15 months for each variable, it can 
capture much more complex relationships than those 
examined above. 
Last winter, shortly after the stock market crash, the 
BVAR model predicted slow growth and low inflation 
for 1988. It predicted that real growth would be 1.9 
percent in 1988 and that inflation, as measured by the 
GNP deflator, would be 3.2 percent (Runkle 1988). 
During the four quarters of 1988, real GNP actually 
grew 2.7 percent and the deflator (unadjusted for the 
drought), 4.1 percent. Thus, according to these figures, 
inflation apparently was higher than the model ex-
pected. 
But it was lower than expected if we take into 
account the unexpected drought and the surprising 
strength of the economy last year. If the model had 
known about these factors, it would have predicted 
higher inflation. In fact, we estimate that it would then 
have predicted growth in the GNP deflator over the four 
quarters of 1988 to be 4.7 percent, about half a per-
centage point higher than that growth actually was. 
(For a description of this model experiment, see the 
Appendix.) 
Saying that the model would have forecast higher 
inflation if it had known about the drought and the 
economy's fast real growth last year may seem like a 
fancy way of justifying the model's error in forecasting 
inflation. But it is similar to the discussion of the con-
ventional analysis above. There we said that, given the 
length of the recovery and the extent of capacity utili-
Table 1 
A Historical Perspective on 
Growth, Resource Use, and Inflation 
Indicator*  1979 1988 
Changes in Output" 
Real Gross National Product (GNP) 




Changes in Price Level** 
GNP Deflator 
Consumer Price Index 
Producer Price Index 











*The real GNP and GNP deflator changes are 4th quarter changes from one year earlier. 
The other three inflation measures are December changes from one year earlier. 
The resource use levels are for December. 
r*The real GNP and GNP deflator changes in 1988 are adjusted for the drought. The CPI and 
PPI measures exclude the volatile food and energy components. 
Sources: U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor, Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
zation, the conventional analysis would have predicted 
higher inflation. Here we are saying that, given the 
occurrence of the drought and the strength of demand, 
the history-based model would have predicted more 
inflation. This is more evidence that low inflation last 
year really was a surprise. 
Accelerating Resource Costs 
Although the general inflation rate did not increase 
much last year, there were signs that it may soon be 
rising. As factories operated close to full capacity and 
record numbers of workers were employed, the costs 
of labor and raw materials accelerated, and they were 
drought is, therefore, the reported rate of inflation minus the 0.6 of a percentage 
point output adjustment. Since the reported growth rate in the deflator is 4.1 
percent, the drought-adjusted measure is 3.5 percent. This estimate seems 
reasonable, for it is very close to another: If, instead, we had adjusted for the 
drought using the narrower private nonfarm deflator, our measure of inflation 
would have been 3.7 percent in 1988. 
Whenever possible, we analyze price measures with temporary influences 
removed. Thus, we generally report year-over-year changes, and when we 
report the consumer and producer price indexes, we exclude the volatile energy 
and food components. 
5 passed on in higher wholesale prices of finished goods. 
Though still at historically low growth rates, producer 
prices and average hourly earnings did rise somewhat 
faster in 1988 than they had in 1987. Also, at the end 
of 1988, the Commodity Research Bureau's industrial 
commodity spot market index, which measures the 
prices of raw materials, stood 5.9 percent over its level 
a year earlier. 
Cost pressures are most apparent in labor compensa-
tion trends. Although wage and salary growth acceler-
ated only a little last year, benefit growth accelerated a 
lot. According to the employment cost index, in 1988 
total compensation per hour increased 4.9 percent, up 
from 3.3 percent the year before. Although growth in 
wages and salaries increased from 3.3 to 4.1 percent 
during this time, growth in benefits increased more, 
from 3.5 to 6.8 percent. Much of the acceleration in 
benefits reflects higher payments for health care and 
Social Security. 
Labor cost pressures also are apparent in data on 
costs per unit of output. In private nonfarm industries, 
over the four quarters of 1988, compensation per hour 
increased 4.8 percent while productivity increased only 
0.7 percent. In round numbers, a 1 percentage point ac-
celeration in compensation and a 1 percentage point 
slowing in productivity growth led to a 2 percentage 
point acceleration in unit labor costs in 1988. 
Looking Ahead 
Moderate Growth Needed... 
With historically high resource utilization rates and 
rising cost pressures, conventional analysis suggests 
that the economy is near full capacity, that is, where the 
supply curve has become steep. (Recall Chart 1.) If 
resource utilization rates continue to climb, cost pres-
sures will continue to build and likely will cause in-
flation in general to accelerate. Compensation costs 
and producer prices already have accelerated at the 
current levels of capacity utilization and unemploy-
ment. According to the conventional view, higher rates 
of resource utilization would lead to further accelera-
tion. That would likely result in higher inflation for final 
goods and services as merchants pass on resource cost 
increases to their customers. 
In order for inflation not to accelerate, total demand 
for goods and services cannot grow much faster than 
2.5 percent per year. Growth at that rate would reflect 
continued high utilization of both capital and labor, 
while faster growth would cause those utilization rates 
to rise. The 2.5 percent rate is an estimate of how fast 
total supply can grow based on the U.S. Labor Depart-
ment's labor force projections and on an analysis of 
productivity trends. A high-employment rate of growth 
around 2.5 percent is also suggested by a number of 
studies (for example, CBO 1988, p. 104; WEFA Group 
1988, p. 2.7; Lieberman 1989, p. 1). 
If demand and supply—and, thus, output—were to 
grow at that rate, the number of new jobs would grow 
less than 200,000 workers per month. To reach that 
target, job growth must slow from its 1988 rate. Last 
year, nonfarm output grew 3.4 percent and payroll 
employment increased 303,000 workers per month. 
These figures show that if the economy is demand-
driven, as conventional analysis suggests, then growth 
in nonfarm output and employment must be cut roughly 
a third to reach a growth rate that will not cause addi-
tional inflation. 
In 1989 nonfarm output growth of 2.5 percent is 
consistent with faster growth in real GNP. According to 
the U.S. Commerce Department, last year the drought 
reduced real GNP growth 0.6 of a percentage point. 
If the drought ends this year, then real GNP should 
grow an extra 0.6 of a percentage point as agricultur-
al output returns to normal levels. The ending of the 
drought can be considered a one-time shift up in total 
supply. Therefore, real GNP could grow 3.1 percent this 
year without increasing rates of resource utilization. 
Still, this is a moderate rate of growth. Convention-
al analysis suggests that there is a fine line between 
growth strong enough to spur inflation and growth slow 
enough to slip the economy into a recession. If demand 
grows more than 2.5 percent, inflation is likely to rise. 
But if demand shrinks, a recession will result. There is 
not much room between 2.5 percent and zero growth. 
... And Predicted 
Yet the BVAR model and many forecasters seem to 
think that the economy will be able to walk this fine 
line in 1989 and 1990. Both demand and prices are 
expected to grow only moderately. 
The BVAR model predicts that over 1989 and 1990 
growth in demand will about match growth in supply 
(Table 2). The model predicts that this year real output 
will grow 3.1 percent—just what we would expect if 
nonfarm output grew 2.5 percent and the drought 
ended.
3 The model also predicts that next year growth 
3 How does a statistical model take into account the ending of a drought? 
We think that embedded in the model's forecast errors last year is a set of shocks 
corresponding to the drought which made real GNP lower than it otherwise 
would have been. As the effects of the drought shocks die out, real GNP will 
tend to rise back to its former path, resulting in temporarily higher real growth. 
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Table 2 
A BVAR Model's Forecast for the U.S. Economy in 1989-90" 
Actual Model Forecast 1948_88 
Indicator 1988 1989 1990 Average 
Annual Growth Rates 
(4th Qtr. % Changes From Year Earlier) 
Real Gross National Product 2.7% 3.1% 2.3% 3.3% 
Consumer Spending 3.6 2.7 2.5 3.4 
Durable Goods 6.4 3.2 0.6 5.1 
Nondurable Goods and Services 3.0 2.7 2.8 3.2 
Investment -1.0 3.1 1.8 4.3 
Business Fixed 5.5 5.7 3.6 3.7 
Residential 2.4 -1.8 -2.9 3.8 
Government Purchases 0.0 4.3 0.6 3.6 
Gross National Product Deflator 4.1 4.0 3.9 4.2 
4th Quarter Levels 
Change in Business Inventories 29.2 bil. 27.2 bil. 27.3 bil. 14.4 bil. 
(1982 $) 
Net Exports (1982 $) -100.7 bil. -104.1 bil. -92.5 bil. -20.7 bil. 
(Exports less Imports) 
Civilian Unemployment Rate 5.3% 5.3% 5.5% 5.7% 
(Unemployment as a % of the Civilian Labor Force) 
*This is the forecast of a Bayesian vector autoregression model using data available on February 10,1989. 
Sources of actual data: U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor 
will slow to 2.3 percent. The slowing in growth seems to 
be explained by a slowing in demand, as the past 
increases in interest rates affect the interest-sensitive 
sectors of the economy (durable goods purchases, 
business fixed investment, and residential investment). 
The model also predicts a slowdown in government 
spending between 1989 and 1990. Altogether, real 
final sales are predicted to grow 2.8 percent in 1989 and 
2.5 percent in 1990. This about matches the convention-
al estimate of supply growth. It also seems consistent 
with the model's estimate of supply growth, since the 
model predicts very little, if any, change in the unemploy-
ment rate over the two years. 
Some evidence from outside the model seems broad-
ly consistent with its moderate growth forecast (Table 
3). The Congressional Budget Office (1989, p. xviii) 
predicts that real GNP will grow in 1989 and 1990 at 
about the same rates that the BVAR model predicts. 
And the Blue Chip consensus forecast (1989, p. 5), the 
median of the forecasts of 51 prominent private econ-
omists, is for growth about half a percentage point 
slower. 
Leading indicators of business investment also 
suggest continued moderate growth in the economy. 
While new orders for nondefense capital goods did not 
grow in the fourth quarter of 1988, order backlogs 
continued to grow substantially. Together with relative 
stability in nonresidential building contracts, these data 
suggest some near-term growth in plant and equipment 
spending, but not as much as in 1988. This judgement is 
supported by the Commerce Department's annual plant 
and equipment survey, which predicts real investment 
growth in 1989 of nearly 6 percent—a robust rate, but 
only half of 1988's. 
Thus, the consensus appears to be that demand will 
grow moderately over the next two years. With the 
capacity constraints facing the economy, this moderate 
growth suggests that inflation might not speed up 
during those years. In fact, both the BVAR model and 
the government and private forecasters expect the in-
7 Table 3 
A Comparison of Growth and Inflation Forecasts 
4th Quarter % Changes From Year Earlier in 
Real GNP  GNP Deflator 
Forecaster  1989  1990  1989  1990 
BVAR Model*  3.1%  2.3%  4.0%  3.9% 
Congressional Budget Office  2.9  2.2  3.9  4.4 
Blue Chip Consensus of 
Private Economists  2.4  1.8  4.3  4.3 
*This is the forecast of a Bayesian vector autoregression model using data available 
on February 10,1989. 
Sources: CBO 1989, p. xviii; Blue Chip 1989, p. 5 
flation rate, measured by growth in the GNP deflator, to 
remain close to the low 4.1 percent rate of 1988. (See 
Table 3.) 
Hedging 
Moderate real growth and inflation seems possible in 
1989-90. But such an outcome will require good luck 
and good policies. 
Good luck is needed, according to the BVAR model. 
Although this model suggests that the moderate out-
come is the most likely one, it also estimates significant 
probabilities that things could go wrong. It estimates, 
for instance, that inflation, as measured by the GNP 
deflator, has a 24 percent probability of accelerating to 
5 percent or more in 1989. And it estimates that the 
chance of a recession (two consecutive quarters of de-
clining real GNP) in 1989 or 1990 is 30 percent. 
To avoid such undesirable outcomes, of course, good 
policy as well as good luck is required. If policy slows 
total demand too much, a recession could result. Since 
the connection between policies and the economy is 
highly uncertain, policymakers must be cautious to 
avoid slowing demand too abruptly. Past experience 
shows that gradually slowing the economy is not easy. 
In the years since 1948 that real GNP growth has 
slowed from one year to the next, for example, growth 
was, on average, 2.8 percentage points lower in the 
second year than in the first. If the economy slowed that 
much this year, we would have a recession, because 
growth last year (adjusted for the drought) was only 2.7 
percent. 
However, even though policymakers must be cau-
tious, they also must be sure to act to restrain inflation in 
order to maintain public confidence. We argued that 
inflation was surprisingly low in 1988 and we expect it 
to remain low in 1989 and 1990. This is a pleasant 
development, but what explains it? We think part of the 
answer is that in the last few years policymakers have 
gained the public's confidence by acting responsibly 
with regard to inflation. We think this confidence is 
reflected in the relatively small movements last year in 
long-term interest rates. And we think it is one reason 
that merchants have been reluctant to pass on cost 
increases: they are confident policymakers will not let 
these cost pressures accelerate further. 
Confidence, however, is a fragile thing. It can be 
shattered if policymakers do not act responsibly—if the 
Federal Reserve does not stick to its policies described 
to Congress in February or if progress is not made on 
the budget deficit. (See paper by Miller in this issue.) 
Without public confidence in 1989 and 1990, the U.S. 
economy could easily cross the fine line to much higher 
inflation. 
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Appendix 
Measuring Demand Effects in a BVAR Model 
In the preceding paper, we said that a Bayesian vector auto-
regression (BVAR) model of the U.S. economy would have 
predicted inflation of 4.7 percent last year if, when the pre-
diction was made, it had known about the drought and the 
strength of demand last year. We explained there (in note 2) 
how we estimated that the drought would have added 0.6 of a 
percentage point to the 1988 inflation rate (the same amount it 
reduced the 1988 output growth). Here we explain how we 
measured the unexpected strength in demand last year and 
determined that it would have added the other 4.1 percent to the 
model's inflation forecast. 
Identifying a Unit Shock 
We determined the effect of the demand strength by first 
identifying a particular set of shocks to the model's core sector 
as a demand shock and then computing what the model's 
inflation forecast would have been if the unexpected strength 
in the economy last year had been caused solely by demand 
shocks.
1 
The most difficult part of our experiment was determining 
how we should define a demand shock There is no unique way 
to define any kind of shock to a BVAR model because the 
model's forecast errors are correlated across equations. 
Researchers have adopted three main methods to orthog-
onalize the shocks, that is, to get rid of the correlation among 
them. The most commonly used method, developed by Sims 
(1980), is to assume that a correct Wold causal chain for the 
model is known. An order for the equations in the model must 
be assumed, and this method assumes that the innovations in 
any equation are orthogonal to the innovations in the equations 
that follow it. Thus, the order of the equations is important for 
this method. Unfortunately, that order is arbitrary and affects 
the model's impulse response functions. 
Another method of orthogonalization is to use standard 
simultaneous-equation techniques and impose identifying as-
sumptions that exclude different variables in each equation 
(Blanchard and Watson 1984, Bernanke 1986, Sims 1986). 
However, Sims (1980) has criticized this method as arbitrary. 
For our model experiment, we adopted yet another method 
of orthogonalization: we used an eigenvector decomposition of 
the covariance matrix of the one-step-ahead forecast errors 
from the core sector of the model (Miller and Roberds 1987).
2 
Since the eigenvectors are orthogonal by construction, we 
checked whether any of them displayed the properties usually 
associated with a demand shock, namely, that the shock to real 
output is positively correlated with the shocks to the price level 
and the interest rate and negatively correlated with the shock to 
inventory accumulation. One of our eigenvectors had those 
properties. With that eigenvector, we defined a unit demand 
shock as a set of one-month changes that go along with a real 
gross national product (GNP) increase of 1 percent: 
Real GNP +1.0% 
Stock Price Index +16.2% 
Foreign Exchange Value of the Dollar +2.5% 
GNP Deflator +0.1% 
Monetary Base —0.1 % 
Treasury Bill Rate +65.7 basis points 
Change in Business Inventories —$8.9 billion. 
Scaling the Shocks 
Having defined a unit demand shock as this set of changes, we 
estimated what our model would have predicted for inflation in 
1988 if, because of demand shocks alone, real GNP had grown 
3.3 percent (its actual growth, if there had been no drought). We 
allocated the additional growth across the quarters of 1988 in 
proportion to the actual growth rate in each quarter. 
We first generated a baseline forecast using data through 
January 1988 and assuming all future shocks were zero. Then, 
for each quarter, we computed the size of the demand shock 
that would be necessary to bring real GNP from the baseline 
forecast level to the level necessary to reach the 3.3 percent 
growth target. We then computed the effect that this shock 
would have on future levels of real GNP and the GNP deflator. 
By scaling the shocks in each period, we determined what the 
model would have predicted about the GNP deflator if the 
deviation between real GNP's baseline forecast and its assumed 
path was caused by this demand shock. 
Using this method, the model predicted that, without a 
drought but with demand as strong as it was, inflation in 1988 
would have been 4.1 percent. 
1 The structure of the national forecasting model maintained by researchers at 
the Minneapolis Fed is discussed by Litterman (1984), Todd (1984), and Roberds 
and Todd (1987). 
2The innovations in the model's core are partially orthogonalized automati-
cally because contemporaneous values of stock prices, the Treasury bill interest 
rate, and the foreign exchange value of the dollar are included in the equations 
for the price level, real gross national product, the monetary base, and the change 
in business inventories. Since we wanted to create our own orthogonalization 
of the core's innovations, before we computed an eigenvector decompositon 
we transformed the core into an equivalent system that included only lagged 
variables in each equation. 
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